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ARTICLES
THE UNITED STATES BANKING
SYSTEM
Edward L. Symons, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The increase in international banking activity over the last
several decades has been- substantial. This is the result of both
the steady increase in international trade and the availability of
technology that now makes it easy to transfer money across in-
ternational borders with little effort and cost. Consequently,
there is a heightened interest in the various regulatory environ-
ments under which banks operate throughout the world.
The banking model in the United States is noticeably differ-
ent from the other three models commonly considered. Each
system has developed in a different political and social culture.
It is evident that economic philosophy is not separate from po-
litical philosophy. Rather, they are intertwined, as shown by the
history of American political culture.
The colonization of America marked not only a physical
but also an intellectual departure from long-standing European
traditions. For centuries, European societies had been hierarchi-
cal and communal. Power, concentrated in the hands of feudal
monarchs and priests, had flowed from the top down, not from
the bottom up. Individuals had been regarded as having duties,
not as enjoying rights.
In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, these
realities began to change. As European economies grew and a
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law; B.A. 1963, Cornell Uni-
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tion for the assistance of Professor Bernard J. Hibbitts of the University of Pittsburgh
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"middle class" of merchants and entrepreneurs began to emerge,
the ancient authority of "prince and pope" was challenged and
in some cases overthrown. Reformation and rebellion swept both
England and the Continent. Philosophers such as Thomas Hob-
bes and, later, John Locke gave intellectual credence to those
developments by espousing the doctrine of liberalism, under
which the political and social power originated, not with a di-
vinely-chosen rule, but rather with individuals giving their con-
sent to be governed.'
This latter concept of consent was particularly popular
among the Pilgrims, an English Puritan sect whose members
came to Massachusetts in 1620. The Pilgrims had already defied
the authority of the English Crown and, as a result, had to seek
sanctuary in Holland. There, their liberal inclinations had only
been reinforced by the political predilections of their Dutch
hosts who in the late sixteenth century had rebelled against im-
perial Spain and who had subsequently established a constitu-
tion which gave substantial authority to individual states and
citizens.2
The Pilgrims' first political act in the New World was, nota-
bly, to sign the Mayflower Compact, an agreement whereby the
colonists declared their intent to "covenant and combine our-
selves into a civil body politic" and "enact ... such equal and
just laws . .. as shall be thought most meet and convenient
. . . .,, This Compact marked the beginning of an American lib-
eral, individualist politics that, just over a century and a half
later, would bear ripe fruit in the two documents - The Decla-
ration of Independence and the Constitution (including the Bill
of Rights) - that to this day continue to define the liberal
framework of American political and economic life.4These initiatives suggest the historical, political, and eco-
nomic spirit of individualism in the midst of democracy in the
United States - the spirit of an individualistic, free enterprise
culture. Americans insisted on enjoying political and economic
1. On the political philosophy of Hobbes and Locke, see generally C.B. MACPHER-
SON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM (1961).
2. For a first-hand contemporary account of the Pilgrims' sojourn in Holland, see
WILLIAM BRADFORD, THE HISTORY OF PLYMOUTH COLONY (1948).
3. Id. at 100.
4. On the historical fortunes of liberalism in American political life, see Louis
HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA (1955), and more recently, JOHN P. DIGGINS,
THE LOST SOUL OF AMERICAN POLITICS: VIRTUE, SELF-INTEREST AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF
LIBERALISM (1984).
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freedoms that in England had never been given more than lip
service. This is important in understanding the diverse and nu-
merous groups of financial institutions and regulatory agencies
found in the United States.
The differences in the United States banking system are
most notable in terms of the separation of banking from com-
merce generally, the separation of banking from non-banking fi-
nancial services, the implementation of a multi-faceted supervi-
sory structure, and the use of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) as a safety net. As the financial services
world has generally moved in the direction of greater liberaliza-
tion in all of these areas, the banking model of the United States
has become more and more distinctive. The reasons for the dif-
ferences between the United States and the other banking mod-
els are caused not only by historical and cultural factors, but
also by the current power to stymie change of political interest
groups that have grown out of these historical and cultural fac-
tors. Without recognition of both historical and cultural factors,
and the related existing interest groups, it is impossible to un-
derstand various aspects of the United States banking model,
such as the multiplicity of regulators, the multiplicity of institu-
tions, the various geographic and activity restraints, and the sep-
aration of various types of financial institutions.
At least in the United States, the concept of the business of
banking historically has been defined as three basic activities:
deposit taking, credit granting, and credit exchange. As the
American economy matured, bankers naturally sought to engage
in a broader range of both financial and commercial activities.
Only a few additional activities, such as fiduciary and trust pow-
ers, were permitted to banks by statute. Most broader activities,
as well as geographic expansion, were not permitted. As a conse-
quence, bank affiliation and bank holding company (BHC)
structures steadily evolved so that banks could both expand over
a greater geographic area and engage in a broader range of activ-
ities prohibited to banks themselves.
To limit geographic expansion over the 2,500 mile breadth
of the United States, and the affiliation of general business ac-
tivities with commercial banks and the business of banking, the
United States Congress passed a variety of legislation. In partic-
ular, it passed the Banking Act of 1933, often referred to as the
1993]
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Glass-Steagall Act,5 which requires substantial separation of
commercial from investment banking. In 1956 it passed the
Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA), which permits BHC sub-
sidiaries to engage only in certain financial, but not commercial,
activities that are closely related to banking.6
Today, the United States has a complex system for the su-
pervision of banks. First, there are the three federal banking
agencies: the Federal Reserve System, the Comptroller of the
Currency, and the FDIC. Second, there are the fifty state bank-
ing departments. Finally, there are a variety of other federal reg-
ulators affecting the operation of banks, such as the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC).
This complexity certainly carries a price. It is a common
statement that United States banks are losing market shares
and that, in general, they are falling apart. However, while much
has changed, American banks have done a good job of holding
their own. While large corporations have switched from bank
loans to the commercial paper markets to fund their activities,
this has not resulted in any loss to the American economy. At
the same time, banks have steadily turned to more fee-based in-
come and have thus captured different portions of the broader
financial services market. Finally, in terms of return on assets
and return on equity, American banks compare favorably to
banks located in other countries.
Nevertheless, the United States has much to consider with
respect to its banking system. Areas of particular interest in-
clude interstate banking, the expansion of retail community
banking powers, such as mutual fund and insurance agency ac-
tivities, and more emphasis on competition regulation rather
than on what is commonly called "micro-regulation."
II. THE EARLY HISTORY OF BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES
The early history of banking in the United States involved
banks formed pursuant to corporate charters individually au-
thorized by the state legislatures, as well as unincorporated, pri-
vate banks. As the early economy of the United States evolved,
5. The Glass-Steagall Act is the common name for four sections of the Banking Act
of 1933, ch. 89, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 24
(1988 & Supp. III 1991); 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1988); 12 U.S.C. § 378; 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1988))
[hereinafter Glass-Steagall Act].
6. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1988).
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bank and corporate charters were sought for a variety of pur-
poses, particularly to benefit agriculture, industrial, and public
improvements such as canals, roads, and waterworks.7 The mix-
ture of banking and commerce in many of these incorporated
entities did not originate in the United States. It was reminis-
cent of much of the economic activity in Europe. As a conse-
quence, banking enterprises became heavily involved in many
commercial undertakings, and it was a common experience that
the combination was not successful. For example, if a canal ven-
ture was a business failure, so much of the bank's assets were
lost in the venture that the bank could not redeem its notes, and
thus it could not function as a bank. In a sense, what was occur-
ring was a type of investment banking, and this mixing of bank-
ing and commercial activities was not viewed as unusual in the
United States. Overall, the idea of uniting banking and business
appeared to survive until the passage of the Free Banking Law
in New York in 1838.8
State legislatures in the early 1800s steadily increased the
number of banks. Over the years, this action resulted in the
granting of so many individual charters that American banking
eventually became much like it is today, a system generally com-
mitted to the "free" chartering of banks and free competition
among the banks, but eventually limited to traditional banking
activities.
Many early banking charters simply granted the "usual"
banking powers without further definition. Apparently, everyone
knew what a bank did, for there had been numerous unincorpo-
rated private banks prior to banks receiving corporate charters.
But banks, like other profit motivated enterprises, often sought
to do more. The eventual response was to grant charters with a
more complete and limiting definition of the business of banking
to deposit taking, credit granting, and credit exchange. Partly,
this was based on a belief that banks were important both to the
success of enterprise and to the functioning of the economy. In
order to assume these two roles, it was determined that banks
should be provided with powers that enabled them to assist in
the functioning of the economy and in serving enterprise, but
which prevented them from becoming so involved in enterprise
7. BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE
CreeL WAR 147-49 (1957).
8. Id. at 337.
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that their stability would by compromised.
The first incorporated bank in the United States was the
Bank of North America, incorporated by the Continental Con-
gress in 1781 and reincorporated in Pennsylvania by an act of
the Pennsylvania Assembly in 1782 because of doubts as to the
validity of the original charter.9 The bank was viewed largely as
a government agency but it was also given power to receive de-
posits and to make private loans. Agricultural interests, which
were much opposed to the Bank of North America, forced the
repeal of its charter in 1785, and substantially limited the pow-
ers granted in its 1787 re-charter. The re-charter expressly pro-
hibited the bank, viewed as a creature of the central govern-
ment, from trading in merchandise and from owning more real
estate than was necessary for its place of business or for loan
collateral.
The First Bank of the United States was chartered in
1791.10 Its charter was prepared by Alexander Hamilton and
patterned after the charter of the Bank of England.11 The char-
ter was unusual in that it was much more detailed and restric-
tive than the early bank charters granted by the states. Similar
to the charter of the Bank of North America, the Bank of the
United States was expressly forbidden from dealing or trading in
commodities or goods.
The creation of the First Bank of the United States re-
flected the continuing concern of agrarian interests with respect
to the Bank of North America. A fundamental debate over the
bank ensued between Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jeffer-
son. Jefferson reflected a major cultural theme of the United
States by expressing his fear of concentrated power in any form.
He instead wanted a weak government that would leave people
free to their own devices and free from governmental intrusion.
The First Bank of the United States became a powerful compet-
itor of the exiting state-chartered banks. By the time its charter
expired in 1811, it had acquired many of the functions of a cen-
tral bank.12 It made substantial loans to both private business
and the government. It circulated notes that became an impor-
tant uniform currency. All of these successful activities were sig-
9. Id. at 50-51.
10. Id. at 128.
11. Id. at 129.
12. EDWARD L. SYMONS, JR. & JAMES J. WHITE, BANKING LAW TEACHING MATERIALS
11-13 (3d ed. 1991).
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nificant in preventing the bank from being re-chartered because
it was such a powerful competitor of the privately owned, state-
chartered banks. The combination of the substantial number of
state-chartered banks and the cultural fear of concentration of
power caused the bank not to be re-chartered, but rather to ex-
pire in 1811.13
A variety of economic problems occurred during and subse-
quent to the War of 1812, and as a result the Second Bank of
the United States was chartered in 1816.14 In addition to the
problems that had plagued the First Bank, the Second Bank
suffered from mismanagement, which *ranged from poor judg-
ment to fraud. The concerns we have today with loans to insid-
ers and affiliates were also serious abuses in the Second Bank of
the United States. As with the First Bank, the Second Bank of
the United States developed many of the values of a central
bank, including creating a more stable currency and causing
state-chartered banks to maintain adequate reserves. Thus, in
effect, the Second Bank played a de facto regulatory role on a
nationwide basis. One could say that these activities of the Sec-
ond Bank, which limited absolute freedom of bank entrepre-
neurs, were a major aspect of its downfall. It was as true then as
it is today that a pure laissez-faire approach guarantees trouble,
and that regulation is necessary to protect fundamental interests
of society and the existence of competition. While Congress
passed the re-charter of the Second Bank in early 1832, the bill
was vetoed by President Jackson.
A. Free Banking
The demise of the Bank of the United States forecasted a
new era of growth for state-chartered banks. Some lessons had
been learned by previous state bank misadventures. Both states
and financial institutions attempted to protect depositors by re-
stricting bank activities. Eventually, the substantial banking ac-
tivity in the states caused the development of free banking,
which resulted in easy entry. It permitted incorporation of a
bank by any group without the need for a special legislative act.
The New York Free Banking Act of 1838 later became a
principal source for the provisions of the National Bank Act in
1864 and for the banking laws of other states. It contained some
13. HAMMOND, supra note 7, at 199, 206, 212-16.
14. SYMONS & WHITE, supra note 12, at 13-19.
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evolving banking provisions which were to become increasingly
important and historically relevant, such as provisions requiring
bank reports, examinations, and reserves.15 The grant of banking
powers in the Free Banking Act was not a source of controversy.
It was assumed that everyone knew what was meant by banking
- the traditional core banking functions of deposit taking,
credit granting, and credit exchange. The limited scope of activi-
ties was consistent with the cultural suspicion of concentration
of economic and political power in the United States. By limit-
ing the scope of bank economic activity, greater economic and,
therefore, political freedom would be protected.
B. The National Bank Act
The National Bank Act (originally titled the National Cur-
rency Act) was passed in 1864.16 As a part of Congress's attempt
to create a market for federal bonds to finance the Civil War,"7
the primary purpose of the Act was to establish banking as a
federal function. The National Bank Act also furthered other
federal concerns, such as the development of a uniform national
currency and a federal depository system for government funds.
The language of the Act was principally drawn from the New
York State Banking Act and was supplemented by material
from the banking acts of several other states. With this Act
came the creation of the Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, which is to this day the primary regulator of nationally
chartered banks.
Rather than forming one bank that could operate on a na-
tional scale - as was true with the First and Second Banks of
the United States - the National Bank Act codified a free
banking issuance of charters through federal law rather than
state law. It also built on the experience of the state free bank-
ing laws by including several important provisions: (1) a require-
ment of reserves against deposits; 8 (2) limitations on the ability
of national banks to own real estate; 19 (3) capital requirements; 0
15. Edward L. Symons, Jr., The "Business of Banking" in Historical Perspective,
51 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 676, 689-92 (1983).
16. Act June 3, 1864, c.106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 38
(1988))
17. Symons, supra note 15, at 689-701.
18. HAMMOND, supra note 7, at 731-32.
19. 12 U.S.C. § 29 (1988).
20. 12 U.S.C. § 51 (1988).
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and, (4) restrictions on loans to a single borrower.2'
The National Bank Act, along with the creation of the Of-
fice of the Comptroller of the Currency, provided for many ad-
vances in bank regulation. It established a central agency to de-
velop expertise in examining and supervising banks, and it
required worthwhile reports of condition. Also, concepts such as
capital adequacy and restrictions on loans to a single borrower
became integral parts of both the state and federal bank regula-
tory systems.
C. The Dual Banking System
One of the expectations of the National Bank Act was that
it would displace or destroy the state-chartered banks. For a va-
riety of reasons, but principally because of the development of
true deposit banking or checking account activity, this displace-
ment did not occur. Rather, a dual banking system was created
- a system in which banking institutions could be chartered by
either a state government or the federal government.22 The
strength of this dual banking system can be seen today, both in
the existence of the fifty state banking departments and in the
fact that several federal laws defer to the states for purposes of
bank regulation and general bank corporation law. A few exam-
ples of bank regulation deference are branch banking s2 and
trust and fiduciary powers.24 Somewhat similar deference to
state law is reflected in the BHCA, largely with respect to BHC
geographic expansion powers.25
By the same token, the laws of many states today have what
are known as wild card statutes, which defer to federal law. Wild
card statutes provide that state-chartered banks have all powers
granted to national banks by federal law.
Today there is substantial overlap between the state and
federal regulatory systems. The overlap first began with the Fed-
eral Reserve Act in 1913, wherein state-chartered banks that be-
came members of the Federal Reserve System were subject to
federal regulation. A more significant overlap occurred with the
passage of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act in
21. 12 U.S.C. § 84(a) (1988).
22. SYMONS & WHrrE, supra note 12, at 23-24, 64-65.
23. 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1988).
24. 12 U.S.C. § 92(a) (1988).
25. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1842(d), 1846 (1988).
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1933, resulting in the situation today whereby virtually all state-
chartered banks have FDIC insurance. As such, they are subject
to federal regulatory supervision by the FDIC. The Banking Act
of 1933, particularly the Glass-Steagall Act, represented the first
federal act that covered all banks, whether state or federally
chartered. It expressly prohibited any banking institution from
engaging in both deposit taking and investment banking.28 The
scope of federal regulation was further increased in 1980 when
the Depository Institutions Deregulation Act required all deposi-
tory institutions to hold some reserves with the Federal Reserve,
either directly or indirectly.
As a consequence, the current dual banking system consists
of two interrelated regulatory systems rather than two indepen-
dent regulatory systems. Whether a bank has a state or national
charter, and whether the bank is or is not a member of the Fed-
eral Reserve, will determine the varying degrees of state and
federal regulation to which the bank will be subject.
D. The Federal Reserve System
Problems with the inelasticity in the money supply and
other defects in the banking system came to a head in the panic
.of 1907. Development of a central bank was viewed as a neces-
sary step to stabilize the banking system. Visions of a central
bank were controversial -for most of the same reasons raised al-
most a century before in the Jacksonian era and during the ter-
mination of the Second Bank. The idea of a powerful central
bank once again aroused agrarian objections. In response to
many of these problems, greater government participation in the
proposed central bank system was provided, and twelve regional
federal reserve banks were established. The purpose of the Act
was to provide an elastic currency, to afford means of redis-
counting commercial paper, and to provide better supervision of
banking. During the 1920s, the Federal Reserve was unable to
control the large number of bank failures. While membership in
the Federal Reserve continued to grow during the 1920s, numer-
ous small, weak banks, still wary of the Federal Reserve System,
refused to become members.
Today, the Federal Reserve has substantial regulatory au-
26. 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1988).
27. PAUL STUDENSKI & HERMAN EDWARD KROOS, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 258-60 (1963).
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thority. One of its major functions is to formulate and imple-
ment monetary policy. The Federal Reserve System also engages
in some regulation and supervision of banking institutions. The
Board has primary federal supervisory and examination respon-
sibility for state-chartered banks that are members of the Sys-
tem. In addition, the Federal Reserve has primary supervisory
responsibility for BHCs and their non-bank subsidiaries.
III. THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSUR-
ANCE CORPORATION
The Great Depression, which began in the early 1930s,
presented the banking system with its most difficult challenge.
The banking and securities regulatory structure that emerged
from the Depression bore little resemblance to the relatively un-
regulated system known in 1929. Congressional reaction to the
Depression established the pervasive government regulation that
now typifies the nation's financial structure, and much of the
remainder of the history of bank regulation has concerned the
effects of the decisions made during the Depression era.2s
In summary, the significant aspects of the Banking Act of
1933 were as follows: (1) for the first time, the United States
created a pervasive program of federal deposit insurance in an
attempt to preclude bank runs by reassuring depositors that
their "grocery money" would be safe; (2) the Act prohibited the
payment of interest on demand deposits (checking accounts); (3)
the Act required the separation of securities activities and affili-
ates from commercial banks (the Glass-Steagall Act); and, (4)
the Act began the regulation of BHCs by limiting the ability of
holding companies to vote their stock in subsidiary banks. 29
The purposes of the FDIC have remained largely constant
since 1933: to maintain confidence in the banking system, pro-
tect bank depositors, and promote safe and sound banking prac-
tices.30 These purposes can be summarized as two: (1) the pro-
tection of the funds of small depositors; and, (2) the stability of,
and public confidence in, the general banking system. Obviously,
the second purpose is also a substantial responsibility of the
28. SYMONS & WHiTE, supra note 12, at 33-42, 545-46.
29. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
30. See K. A. Randall, The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation: Regulatory
Functions and Philosophy, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 696 (1966).
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Federal Reserve System as the lender of last resort.
As well as insuring deposits of virtually every chartered
bank in the United States, the FDIC is the primary federal regu-
lator for the approximately 8,000 state-chartered banks that are
not members of the Federal Reserve System. Also, the FDIC has
the power to engage a variety of means of aiding faltering banks.
Finally, the FDIC acts as receiver for all failed national banks
and has the power to act as receiver for failed state-chartered,
FDIC-insured banks.
With a strengthened Federal Reserve System, a new FDIC,
and an already powerful Comptroller of the Currency, the bank-
ing structure evolved from the Depression with a federal regula-
tory scheme designed to control as many banks as possible with-
out eliminating the state banking system. State-chartered banks
were subject to Federal Reserve regulations if they joined that
system, or FDIC control if they wished merely to have the safety
of federal insurance. These three agencies, assisted by several
federal agencies that supervise or regulate other financial insti-
tutions, constitute the bulwark of federal banking regulation to-
day. Obviously, since a bank may be subject to more than one of
these regulatory bodies, a degree of cooperation and unified rul-
ings are essential to their success. The degree of diversity in reg-
ulation, as well as function, of these agencies, therefore, must be
kept in mind to determine whether the system that has emerged
from United States banking history is one that should be
perpetuated.
IV. MODERN TRENDS IN BANKING
A. The Bank Holding Company Act
. The passage of the BHCA in 1956 was driven by two con-
cerns: (1) geographic expansion through affiliated banks; and, (2)
the affiliation of banks with commercial enterprise. Subsequent
to the Banking Act of 1933, two developments took place involv-
ing the affiliation of individual banks with various financial and
non-financial activities.
One development was the formation of BHCs, designed to
permit a bank to affiliate with other banks outside its normal
geographic territory. This development enabled banks, through
the holding company structure, to avoid the rules against the
branching of a single bank, whether in-state or interstate, by
creating the holding company parent and then opening addi-
[Vol. XIX:I
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tional subsidiary banks which technically are not branches of
each other.
The holding company format also enabled banks to affiliate
with non-banking activities (e.g., insurance, farming, and manu-
facturing) that might otherwise have been prohibited as activi-
ties outside the business of banking.
Both of these developments caused concern. One concern
was that ownership of several banks by a single BHC could cre-
ate an undue concentration of banking resources. The second
concern was that the ownership by a BHC of non-bank enter-
prises could create undue connections between banks and other
businesses. As a consequence, the BHCA was passed in 1956 to
regulate the concentration and geographic expansion of BHCs
owning two or more banks and their affiliation with non-bank-
ing, and particularly non-financial, activities. In 1970, the BHCA
was amended to include BHCs owning only one bank.
B. International Banking
Historically, as the activities of the businesses that banks
serve have expanded beyond the boundaries of the United
States, so have the activities of the banks, as they strive to con-
tinue to provide all possible banking services to their corporate
customers.
National banks and state-chartered banks that are members
of the Federal Reserve may create a foreign branch of the bank
with the approval of the Federal Reserve. Thus, such banks may
do business as a bank and be regulated as a bank in a foreign
country. Foreign banking activity of state-chartered, non-mem-
ber banks is virtually nonexistent. A second permissible form of
international banking is for a United States bank or BHC to
own a bank that is separately incorporated in a foreign country.
It is well understood that in many foreign countries banks
are permitted to offer a broader variety of financial services than
are banks in the United States. These activities sometimes are
termed "merchant banking" and involve the provision of invest-
ment banking, and insurance and export financial services, in-
cluding the power to take title to goods being exported or im-
ported. As a consequence of these concerns, Congress passed the
Export Trading Companies Act in 1982.31 A significant provision
31. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(14) (1988); 12 C.F.R. §§ 211.31-211.34 (1992).
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of the Act enables banks incorporated in the United States to
engage in various forms of "merchant banking" in their interna-
tional trade financing activities. However, few export trading
companies have been created.
A more popular approach to international banking has been
what is known as the Edge Act corporation, which is a domestic
subsidiary or affiliate of a United States bank engaged in inter-
national banking and finance, including those activities which
take place in the United States.32 Such a corporation may have
branches and subsidiaries both in foreign countries and in other
states in the United States that the BHC might not be able to
branch into otherwise.
Entry of foreign banks into the United States is compara-
tively recent, and so the concern over their regulation also is
more recent. The basic legislation in this area is the Interna-
tional Banking Act of 1978. 3 Generally, the International Bank-
ing Act provides the following: (1) restriction on interstate de-
posit taking activities by foreign banks; (2) application of
Federal Reserve requirements to foreign branches and agencies;
(3) requirement of deposit insurance for branches of foreign
banks doing a retail business; (4) application of the non-bank
activity restrictions of the BHCA to foreign banks that operate
branches or agencies; and, (5) availability of Federal Reserve
discount window access to foreign bank agencies and branches.3 4
The Act generally made substantial strides toward national
treatment of foreign banks operating in the United States, pro-
viding approximately equally competitive positions for foreign
banks, as compared to United States banks, with respect to their
United States operations.
C. The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
From an examination of the history of the American bank-
ing system, it is evident that there is a diverse and frequently
overlapping group of regulators. As a consequence, there has
been a gradual movement to simplify the regulatory system and
reduce the number of regulators.
32. 12 U.S.C. §§ 601, 611-615 (1988).
33. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3108 (1988), amended by 12 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3108 (Supp. III
1991).
34. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3107 (1988), amended by 12 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3107 (Supp. III
1991).
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A first step along this uncertain road was the establishment
of the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council in
1978. Its purpose is to attempt to make consistent among the
various federal regulatory agencies the regulations and standards
for examination of financial institutions, so that any regulator
looking at a particular financial institution would apply the
same standards and reach the same conclusions regarding the
safety and soundness of the institution as would any other regu-
lator. The Examination Council was given only an advisory role
but its work has had some effect, on the separate regulators.
V. SUMMARY OF BANKING STRUCTURE SINCE 1980
A. Legislation
In 1980, banking legislation in the United States took on a
different tone from that of the 1930s legislation - a tone of de-
regulation. In that year, Congress began the process of lifting the
limit on interest rates that financial institutions could pay and
allowed savings associations to make a limited amount of both
consumer loans and investments in commercial real estate. At
the same time, Congress raised the ceiling on federal deposit in-
surance from 40,000 dollars to 100,000 dollars per account,
which is even today probably the highest government deposit in-
surance in the world.3
In 1982, Congress passed a further deregulation statute, the
Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act, in which Con-
gress removed additional barriers among the various types of fi-
nancial institutions.36 Under that Act, savings associations were
given bank-like loan powers. All depository institutions were
given the power to offer money market deposit accounts, which
are not limited as to interest rate payable by the institution, are
not subject to reserve requirements, and may be coupled with a
checking account in order to make third-party payments.
Through such a coupling, banks were permitted to compete ef-
fectively with the money market mutual funds offered by securi-
ties firms.
Savings associations suffered large losses in the mid-1980s
and began to fail by the hundreds. Congressional legislation then
35. The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989,
Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183.
36. Gan-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96
Stat. 1469 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
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began to take on a different tone - one of increased regulatory
authority, rather than deregulation. In 1987, Congress concluded
that the savings association problem could be solved for approxi-
mately ten billion dollars and passed the Competitive Equality
Banking Act of 1987 (CEBA).3 7 While the Act in part sought to
create more competitive equality among banks and savings as-
sociations, the legislation also put a moratorium on various de-
regulation efforts. The primary objective of CEBA was to pro-
vide a period of regrouping without substantial changes in
powers, and to replenish the financial resources of the then ex-
isting Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
(FSLIC). The legislation suggested that Congress faced great un-
certainty in trying to reconcile questions of deregulation of bank
powers and geographic expansion with the increasing concern
over the safety and soundness of the banks and thrift institu-
tions. The Act was ineffective. Thrift institutions and bank fail-
ures continued to grow and the FSLIC did not have sufficient
funds to support the losses suffered by the thrift institutions.
As a consequence, in 1989, Congress passed the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIR-
REA).38 The legislation totally reorganized the supervisory
structure and powers of the thrift institutions, placed the thrift
insurance fund under the administration of the FDIC, and gave
the FDIC significantly enhanced regulatory enforcement powers.
The Act may increase the likelihood of consolidation of the de-
pository institutions industry, not only due to the closing of nu-
merous failed thrifts, but also due to the authorization which
enables BHCs to acquire savings and loan associations. FIRREA
also created the Office of Thrift Supervision, under the Secre-
tary of the Treasury, with the same degree of autonomy as the
Comptroller of the Currency."9 This new entity now has princi-
pal authority for the examination, operation, and regulation of
federal savings associations. Overall, the Act was the most im-
portant piece of legislation concerning America's financial insti-
tutions since the 1930s.
The driving force behind the legislation was the funding of
the deposit insurance costs of the failed thrifts. In brief, the ini-
37. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 2(a), 101 Stat.
552 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 3806 (1987)).
38. The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989,
Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (amended in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)).
39. 12 U.S.C. § 1462a (1988).
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tial authorized cost was fifty billion dollars. The expected cost to
the United States taxpayers has been hotly debated, and has
been estimated to be as much as five-hundred billion dollars, in-
cluding interest costs.
In 1991, Congress passed the FDIC Improvements Act.40
This Act again increased supervisory powers and attempted to
reform the structure and cost of the insurance system. The legis-
lation required the early closing of institutions whose tangible
equity capital drops below two percent of assets, effectively
redefining when a depository institution becomes insolvent.41 It
also strengthened the idea that failed institution resolution
should occur on a least-cost basis. Nevertheless, the real force
behind the legislation was the necessity of providing the Bank
Insurance Fund with additional financial resources. The FDIC
borrowing authority from the United States Treasury was in-
creased from three billion to thirty billion dollars.42
Yet another way the legislation attempted to reduce the
cost of failed institutions was to limit fully secured discount win-
dow loans by the Federal Reserve, the long-term use of which
was thought to allow uninsured depositors time to leave an insti-
tution, thus increasing the cost of failure to the deposit insur-
ance funds. The Act also limited the ability of institutions to
accept brokered deposits, another area that is believed to have
contributed to losses in failed thrift institutions.
When all is considered, however, Congress has yet to deal
systemically with restructuring the bank regulatory system to be
consistent with the various historic policies of safety and sound-
ness, public confidence, economic neutrality, efficiency, and ac-
ceptable levels of bank concentration.
B. Regulatory Enforcement Powers
A final aspect of the current banking model in the United
States is the supervisory enforcement powers of the bank regula-
tors. As banks and BHCs have steadily received expanded pow-
ers through both legislation and decisions by courts and admin-
istrative agencies, and 'so have been exposed to additional risk in
40. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvements Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991).
41. 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(c)(3)(B)(i) (Supp. I1 1991); 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(h)(3)(A)
(Supp. 1I 1991).
42. 12 U.S.C. § 1824 (1988), amended by 12 U.S.C. § 1824(a) (Supp. 1 1991).
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the eyes of the regulators, the supervisory enforcement activities
of the regulators have increased. Congress has agreed with the
need for additional supervisory enforcement, as it has provided
the regulators with a steadily increasing array of supervisory en-
forcement powers. The most important powers are the following:
(1) cease and desist and temporary cease and desist orders; (2)
temporary suspension and permanent removal of officers, direc-
tors, and other institution affiliated persons; (3) civil money pen-
alty orders; and, (4) capital directives. 43
Permanent cease and desist orders may be issued to stop
unsafe or unsound practices, to stop violations of law, rule, regu-
lation, or conditions imposed in connection with applications,
and to stop violations of written agreements between the bank
and the regulator." A permanent order may be issued only
where a violation or practice has been established in an adminis-
trative hearing. The grounds for permanent cease and desist or-
ders are only somewhat different from the grounds for tempo-
rary cease and desist orders.
Temporary cease and desist orders may be issued immedi-
ately, without an administrative hearing first having taken
place.45 For a temporary cease and desist order to be issued, the
violation or threatened violation, or the unsafe or unsound bank-
ing practice specified in the notice of charges, must be likely to
cause a significant dissipation of assets, or of the condition of
the bank, or seriously prejudice the interest of depositors. In
theory, such orders are designed to address critical threats to an
institution and, therefore, allow an exception from normal
United States adjudicatory procedures that provide for due pro-
cess. In fact, it appears that the current law effectively autho-
rizes the agencies to accompany virtually every notice of charges
for a permanent cease and desist order with an immediate tem-
porary cease and desist order.
The procedure for suspension or removal of officers, direc-
tors, and other persons affiliated with banks and BHCs is some-
what complicated and involves more difficult proof than that re-
quired for a cease and desist order. Persons may be removed
both for conduct in the bank and for prior conduct at another
bank or business. The regulator must prove the following: (1) a
43. See generally 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)-(i) (1988), amended by 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(i)
(Supp. III 1991); 12 U.S.C. § 1831 (Supp. III 1991).
44. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b) (1988), amended by 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b) (Supp. III 1991).
45. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c) (1988), amended by 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c) (Supp. III 1991).
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violation of a statute or regulation, an unsafe or unsound bank-
ing practice, or a breach of fiduciary duty; (2) some loss or
prejudice to the bank or its depositors or some financial gain to
the individual (which enables a removal action to proceed with-
out having either to quantify the loss or to prove substantial loss
or serious prejudice); and, (3) the violation, practice, or breach
either involves personal dishonesty, or demonstrates willful or
continuing disregard for the safety or soundness of the bank.46
Interim suspensions can also be ordered. The proof is virtu-
ally the same except that the temporary suspension must be
thought to be "necessary for the protection of the"47 institution
or its depositors. It is not at all clear that the additional require-
ment really adds anything to the burden of proof of the agency.
It is possible for an attorney or accountant to be suspended or
removed as an affiliated person, and the power can even apply to
an entire law firm or accounting firm. Finally, it is important to
note that any suspension or removal of an officer or other person
from one institution automatically bars that person from further
activity with respect to all other insured depository institutions
in the United States.48
The most dramatic changes made by FIRREA with respect
to supervisory enforcement powers concern the civil money pen-
alty provisions.49 There now are three tiers of violations. A first
tier violation involves a violation of any law or regulation, any
final or temporary regulatory order or condition, or any written
agreement. A person acting in the utmost good faith can violate
this first tier standard. A second tier violation requires a first
tier violation or reckless engagement in an unsafe or unsound
practice or breaching a fiduciary duty, plus having such viola-
tion, practice or breach being part of a pattern of misconduct, or
causing more than minimal loss to the institution, or resulting in
pecuniary gain to the individual. Therefore, in a second tier vio-
lation there is some modest scienter requirement. The third tier
violation includes a second tier violation in the sense of a viola-
tion, practice or breach, plus the individual knowingly or reck-
lessly causing a substantial loss or receiving a substantial gain.
Penalties are usually assessed against an individual rather
46. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e) (1988), amended by 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e) (Supp. 1 1991).
47. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(d)(4) (1988), amended by 12 U.S.C. § 1818(d) (Supp. 1I 1991).
48. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(7) (1988), amended by 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(e)(7), 1818(i)(2)
(civil penalties) & 1818(j) (criminal penalties) (Supp. 1I 1991).
49. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i) (1988), amended by 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (Supp. II 1991).
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than against a bank, in order to get directly to the root of the
problem and to penalize the cause of the violation - the indi-
vidual - rather than the victims - the bank, its depositors, and
its shareholders. A typical basis for a civil money penalty is a
violation of the various bank lending limits, such as making
loans to insiders and affiliates. The amount of the civil money
penalty can be substauitial. While the first tier penalties are for
minor violations, a violator may be liable for a penalty of up to
5,000 dollars per day. Second tier penalties can be as much as
25,000 dollars per day, and third tier penalties can be as high as
-one million dollars per day.
A final important aspect of regulatory supervision powers is
the capital directive.5 The banking agencies are given the au-
thority to establish minimum levels of capital and to issue "di-
rectives" enforceable in a federal district court in the manner
that cease and desist orders are enforced. Under the banking
agency regulations, the agency notifies the bank of the agency's
intent to issue a directive."' The notice includes the amount or
ratio to be required, as well as the proposed deadline. The bank
has an opportunity to respond in writing if it does not consent
to the proposed directive. Following consideration of the bank's
response, if any, the agency may issue a directive or require the
bank to submit an acceptable plan of its own. Once the directive
is final, any subsequent violation is enforceable just as a final
cease and desist order is enforceable, without any further due
process hearing.52
C. Summary of Current Structure and Scope of Powers in the
United States Banking Model
There are two general chartering authorities for banking in-
stitutions - the state and federal governments. Thus, we have
state-chartered banks and federally-chartered banks. A state-
chartered bank is primarily regulated by each state's depart-
ment of banking. A national bank is primarily regulated by the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).
After this initial, simple outline, matters become more com-
plicated. All national banks must be members of the Federal Re-
serve System and must be insured by the FDIC. Consequently,
50. 12 U.S.C. § 3907 (1988).
51. 12 C.F.R. §§ 3.12, 3.16-3.19, 268.32, 325.6 (1992).
52. 12 U.S.C. § 3907(B)(ii) (1988).
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they are subject to some regulation by both agencies in addition
to the OCC. In order to compete with national banks for deposit
funds, virtually all state-chartered banks also are insured by the
FDIC and, thus, are subject to both that agency's regulations
and their state banking department's regulations. Some state-
chartered banks are members of the Federal Reserve System
and, therefore, are also regulated by the Federal Reserve. Conse-
quently, one can say that we have three types of banking institu-
tions: (1) national banks; (2) state-chartered member banks;
and, (3) state-chartered non-member banks.
The complications can be even greater. For example, sup-
pose that there is a state-chartered, non-member bank and a na-
tional bank owned by the same BHC. The state-chartered bank
is regulated by both the state banking department and the
FDIC. The national bank is primarily regulated by the OCC.
The holding company and its non-bank subsidiaries are subject
to the regulation of the Federal Reserve Board under the
BHCA.5 3 In addition, there is the regulatory authority of the
SEC over certain financial institution activities, particularly the
issuance of securities by the parent BHC.
If one were writing on a clean slate, it is doubtful that such
a regulatory structure would be designed. Nevertheless, each ele-
ment of the regulatory structure has come about at least partly
because of historically felt needs of American society responded
to by Congress in the evolution of the American banking system
since the eighteenth century.
The United States appears to stand alone as the only nation
that does not have a system of nationwide banking. While the
ability to engage in something approximating nationwide bank-
ing has improved significantly in the last decade, the topic re-
mains a major concern. It is evident that the combination of eco-
nomic problems in banking (with the resulting legislative
changes) and electronic capabilities have significantly changed
the way banks conduct business and the limitations on their ge-
ographic expansion. Various loopholes, qualifications, and statu-
tory exceptions have been created, with the result that the cur-
rent interpretation of the law appears to reflect neither the
traditional underlying policies of geographic limitation nor the
modern reality of technology and international banking. In fact,
the irony is that the largest banks have managed to bob and
53. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1988).
1993]
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
weave through the supposedly restrictive laws governing geo-
graphic expansion to reach national markets in a substantial
way - the large banks that the laws were designed to restrain,
in fact, have been most successful in avoiding them. As a conse-
quence, it appears that Congress will have to face the issue of
developing a more rational system of nationwide banking.
The United States also stands almost alone as the only
country which extensively limits the financial products and ser-
vices that a bank may offer or be affiliated with. This issue arises
both in the policy of separating banking and non-banking finan-
cial services and in the policy of separating banking and
commerce.
Because of these limitations, the BHC structure is essen-
tially unique to the United States. It is a structure wherein a
holding company controls the stock of one or more commercial
banks as well as the stock of other, non-banking entities that
engage in businesses "closely related to banking." While the
BHC structure has been rather successful as a vehicle to avoid
geographic limitations, it has been less successful as a vehicle to
enable banks to affiliate with a broader scope of permissible ac-
tivities. Nevertheless, BHCs clearly have the power to engage in
a variety of financial-related services, such as mortgage banking,
personal property and real estate leasing, data processing, cou-
rier services related to banking activities, some management
consulting activities, a limited range of insurance underwriting
with respect to credit life, accident and health insurance, and a
rather extensive array of securities activities. Consequently, un-
like many holding companies found outside the United States,
United States BHCs may not be used to link banking and com-
merce. Rather, they may be used as a cumbersome means to in-
tegrate various financial services.
In the United States, a unique bank regulatory structure is
equally evident as compared to those of other countries. In vir-
tually all other countries, one authority regulates banking, secur-
ities, and insurance activities. Again, there are cultural and his-
torical reasons for the differences. For the historical reasons
previously discussed, the United States has about 12,000 com-
mercial banks. By contrast, in other countries fewer financial in-
stitutions exist, and so supervisory relationships can be more
informal.
While other countries have some areas of regulatory overlap,
the United States is probably unmatched in this area. There has
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been extreme resistance to changing the regulatory structure.
Many of the state-chartered, non-member banks prefer the
ready access they have to the state banking departments. There
also is a belief in the United States that a multifaceted regula-
tory system safeguards against unyielding, unchanging, excessive
regulation. Historically, the system has permitted banks to
change regulators if one agency is viewed as excessively burden-
some in its regulatory approach or if the statutory authority for
the banking institution is viewed as too restrictive.5 4 A third ar-
guable value of the multifaceted United States regulatory struc-
ture is the related concept of competition. At various times one
regulator has displayed a greater willingness to change, with the
result being that the different approach of another regulator has
turned out to be valuable and subsequently adopted by other
bank agencies. Finally, and related to the initial value of access,
is the view that the multifaceted regulatory structure is consis-
tent with the evolution of an American political system divided
into a pluralist number of interest groups whose public debate is
ultimately conducive to the public interest. Historically, it can
be argued that such a methodology has yielded results not
sought by any of the various constituencies, but results that
have well served the public interest.
While virtually all nations have some form of deposit insur-
ance, it is probable that the United States deposit insurance sys-
tem is the one in which the government plays the largest role.
Again there may be cultural reasons for this phenomenon. In the
majority of countries that have relatively few banks, informal
government oversight of banks may be more persuasive in caus-
ing the private sector to play a larger role in supporting and
resolving troubled and failed banks. Also, the idea of individual-
ism often causes American institutions, as well as individuals,
not to cooperate with the suggestions of government authority.
As a consequence, in the United States the deposit insurance
scheme is largely government operated. The federal insurance
scheme guarantees up to 100,000 dollars without any risk to the
depositor. The system historically has been funded by annual
premiums charged to banks. The premium rate has increased
significantly in the last several years to where it is approaching
an annual rate of between 0.23 percent and 0.31 percent of in-
54. 12 U.S.C. §§ 35, 214-214c (1988). See also SYMONS & WHITE, supra note 12, at
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sured deposits.
The rest of the safety and soundness regulatory scheme in
the United States is similar to that in other nations. It appears
that the driving concern which caused intervention is primarily
about systemic risk - risk to the bank credit and payments sys-
tem as a whole.
A brief summary of current bank and BHC powers com-
pletes the historical discussion of the United States banking
model. The historical articulation of the power to engage in the
business of banking permits banks to engage in deposit taking,
credit ranging, and credit exchange. 5 Today these activities take
numerous permissible forms, limited on a public policy basis by
the principles of safety and soundness, economic neutrality in
the allocation of credit, and economic concentration. Even activ-
ities within the business of banking may be limited so that the
exercise of the power does not violate these underlying
principles.
For example, the deposit taking power is limited with re-
spect to brokered deposits. 6 The credit granting power is sub-
ject to limits on loans to a single borrower,57 on loans to insid-
ers, 58 and on loans to affiliates.59 The credit exchange power is
subject to limits on a single customer and on aggregate dollar
values of bankers acceptance.6 0
Banks have additional specific powers, beyond the general
business of banking power, expressly granted by statute. If an
activity is not within the business of banking, it must be ex-
pressly granted by statute to be a bank power. Examples of ex-
press powers are loans secured by liens on real estate,6 ' leases of
personal property that are not the functional equivalent of
loans,62 trust and fiduciary powers,63 and owning and dealing in
investment securities. 4 Primarily through regulatory interpreta-
tion and judicial decision, the scope of these various powers has
55. 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (1988), amended by 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (Supp. III 1991).
56. 12 U.S.C. § 1831(f) (1988), amended by 12 U.S.C. § 1831(f) (Supp. III 1991).
57. 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1988).
58. 12 U.S.C. § 375(a), (b) (1988), amended by 12 U.S.C. § 375(a), 375(b) (Supp. III
1991).
59. 12 U.S.C. § 371(c) (1988).
60. 12 U.S.C. § 372 (1988).
61. 12 U.S.C. § 371 (1988), amended by 12 U.S.C. § 371(a) (Supp. III 1991).
62. 12 U.S.C. § 24(10) (1988).
63. 12 U.S.C. § 92(a) (1988).
64. 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (1988), amended by 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (Supp. III 1991).
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gradually expanded. The most notable areas of expansion have
been in the area of securities activities, finance leasing, and
credit exchange activities such as interest rate swaps.
BHCs have the power to engage in activities "closely related
to banking, '6 5 as well as various express powers. In theory, the
power to engage in activities closely related to banking should be
broader than the power to engage in the business of banking. To
some extent this is the case, but not to the extent one would
expect. Particularly with respect to securities and insurance
powers, BHC powers are only marginally greater than bank pow-
ers, most notably in the area of corporate equity securities un-
derwriting. On the other hand, BHCs do have broader real es-
tate powers than banks, such as real estate leasing. Finally,
BHCs have some express powers, the most interesting of which
is the power to own up to five percent of the voting shares (com-
mon stock) of any company.6 As with any other bank or BHC
power, this power is subject to the regulatory determination that
a particular exercise of the power is an unsafe or unsound
practice.
VI. THE CREATION AND THE SHREDDING OF THE UNITED STATES
BLUEPRINT FOR BANK POWERS AND REGULATION
The state banking laws and the National Bank Act histori-
cally have limited banks to three types of "business of bank-
ing"6" powers - deposit taking, credit granting, and credit ex-
change. These limitations on powers are based on long-standing
United States policies of safety and soundness of the banking
system, economic neutrality in the allocation of credit, and limi-
tation of the concentration of economic power. 8
Beginning in the 1930s, Congress enacted legislation, be-
yond the National Bank Act and the Federal Reserve Act, to
construct additional walls to separate financial institutions. The
first wall was the Glass-Steagall wall separating commercial
65. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1988).
66. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6) (1988).
67. The National Bank Act was originally adopted in 1863 as the National Currency
Act, Act of Feb. 25, 1862, ch. 58, § 11, 12 Stat. 665, 668. The Act was titled the National
Bank Act in 1874, Act of June 20, 1874, ch. 343, § 1, 18 Stat. 123. See generally Symons,
supra note 15.
68. See Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, Thinking the Unthinkable: What Should Com-
mercial Banks or Their Holding Companies be Allowed to Own?, 67 IND. L.J. 251, 254
(1992); 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1988).
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banking from the securities business.69 That wall has been under
steady attack through both the activities of banks and the activ-
ities of bank holding company non-bank subsidiaries. The sec-
ond wall was the Regulation Q wall, which limited price compe-
tition among banks by imposing interest rate ceilings.70 That
wall was eliminated in 1986.71 A third wall was the McFadden
wall, which effectively prohibited interstate banking, particu-
larly when coupled with the Douglas Amendment to the BHCA
- which prohibited BHCs from acquiring banks outside their
home office state unless the laws of the target state explicitly
provide for such entry.72 This wall, too, has largely fallen, partly
because of changes in state laws permitting national or regional
interstate banking, partly by the permanent grandfathering of
the non-bank banks which, for technical definitional purposes,
were not banks under the BHCA (until CEBA in 1987) and so
are not limited by the prohibition of the Douglas Amendment,
and partly by judicial interpretation. 3
In a sense, these three walls - the Glass-Steagall wall, the
Regulation Q wall, and the McFadden wall - were all developed
to support and protect the historic concept of the business of
banking: to keep that activity separate from other commercial
endeavors; to keep that activity from being part of an unduly
concentrated entity; and to maintain public confidence.
As securities companies, in particular, have been able to of-
fer deposit-like products, and as inflation and technology have
made such products both attractive and feasible, the historic
special protection of the business of banking has been deterio-
rating. This development has put a strain on what parts of the
69. 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (1988), amended by 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (Supp. III 1991); 12
U.S.C. §§ 78, 377, 378 (1988).
70. 12 C.F.R. § 217.7 (1983).
71. See 12 U.S.C. § 317b note (1988). See also MARTIN MAYER, THE GREATEST-EVER
BANK ROBBERY 92-93 (1990) (discussing the effects of the dismantling of Regulation Q);
The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-
221.
72. 12 U.S.C. §§ 36, 1842(d) (1982).
73. See SYMONS & WHITE, supra note 12, at 81. See, e.g., Board of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Financial Corp., 474 U.S. 361 (1986) (interstate geo-
graphic expansion by bank); FAIC Securities, Inc. v. United States, 768 F.2d 352 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (brokered deposits to maximize insurance coverage), Securities Indus. Ass'n v.
Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1059 (1988) (bank holding company underwriting of securities), Office of the Comptroller
of Currency Interpretive Letter No. 403 (Dec. 9, 1987) (bank providing investment ad-
vice, brokerage, and proprietary mutual fund) [hereinafter OCC Letter].
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walls do remain, as well as on the profitability of the banking
system. Market forces are continuing to surge over and around
the various historic protections. The walls have fallen and the
blueprint has been shredded largely by judicial and administra-
tive decision, rather than by Congressional restatement of pol-
icy. The federal legislative grid lock is evident, other than for
necessary funding of the cost of dealing with troubled and failed
depository institutions. In general, regulators have been at-
tempting to protect the stability of the banking system - by
trying to monitor and control the velocity of change in activities,
by trying to increase the capital of banks to protect against un-
foreseen losses, and by increasing the use of supervisory enforce-
ment powers to discipline both banks and individual directors
and officers of banks who go beyond the activities deemed per-
missible to financial institutions.
A. The Permissible Powers and Affiliations for Banks
Steadily increasing affiliations between institutions with
bank charters and securities, insurance, real estate, and other
entities have again raised questions about the proper powers and
affiliations for banks. The BHCA has always had, as one of its
fundamental policies, a provision that banks should be sepa-
rated from general commercial activities."4 The history of United
States bank regulation suggests that this policy was rather well-
established even before the passage of the BHCA. Banks gener-
ally have been prohibited from making equity investments in
commercial enterprises in the United States.
While it is reasonable to suggest that the policy of separat-
ing banking from various financial activities may need reexami-
nation, there is little historical support, and therefore a limited
expectation, for this policy to be completely abolished in the
United States. The absence of such a separation would most
probably lead to a repetition of the early banking experience in
the United States, when bank investment in commercial activi-
ties caused significant loss of depositors' funds. Even a prohibi-
tion of bank participation in such equity investments, if coupled
with authorization for general commercial enterprises to control
banks, would adversely affect the economic neutrality of banks'
credit granting decisions and test any fire walls erected - a reg-
74. 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1988), amended by 12 U.S.C. § 1843(f)(2)(A), (3)(b)(ii), (10)
(Supp. III 1991).
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ulatory approach that historically has failed in times of eco-
nomic stress.
There is, however, some historical support for changing the
scope of the separation of banking from other financial activi-
ties. The legislative history of the BHCA of 1956 stated: "Your
committee believes that BHCs ought not to manage or control
non-banking assets having no close relationship to banking. ' '1 5
Based on this statement of policy, the Act then permitted, sub-
ject to stated limitations, bank affiliations with subsidiaries that
were "of a financial, fiduciary or insurance nature. ' '1 6
There are numerous historical examples of affiliation be-
tween banks and other financial activities. One of the primary
reasons for the enactment of the National Bank Act was to place
banks in the securities business. The federal government needed
national banks to distribute its securities to finance the Civil
War. The banks purchased and either held or resold those secur-
ities. In addition, trust management as a form of securities activ-
ity has been closely affiliated with banking at least since shortly
after the end of the Civil War. Some banks began their opera-
tions as insurance companies. Currently, savings banks in New
York and a few other states continue to sell life insurance as
they have done for decades.
There are reasons for these affiliations. They do not neces-
sarily undermine the principles of the BHCA with respect to
safety and soundness, economic neutrality, and economic con-
centration. Moreover, there is a fundamental relation among
banking, securities, and insurance activities. All involve the tak-
ing of some form of deposit. All take large amounts of public
financial wealth, either as general deposits, insurance premium
deposits or special deposits for investment purposes. All have
the provision of money related services as their primary purpose.
All serve as an indirect method of consumer loans and invest-
ments in other sectors of the economy. All serve as critical
points of exchange for financing general commercial enterprises
in our economy that should remain economically neutral. All act
as allocators of our capital resources to their most efficient use in
our economy. The government, therefore, regulates each activity
to promote safety and soundness and economic neutrality.
75. See S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2482.
76. See Bank Holding Companies Act of 1956, 70 Stat. 135, 137, § 4(c)(6).
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Perhaps because of this historical basis, there has been a
gradual broadening of the scope of permissible affiliations of
banks to encompass other forms of financial institutions. Thus,
affiliations between banking, securities, and insurance entities
are becoming more common. All of these activities provide for
some form of investment opportunity. To a certain extent, real
estate investment has been included within this grouping, most
commonly where the real estate activity is a passive investment
by the bank rather than where the bank is actively engaging in
real estate development.
Generally speaking, the permissible affiliations for banking
organizations are regulated by the Federal Reserve for bank
holding companies' non-bank subsidiaries, by the FDIC for
state-chartered non-member banks that are not part of a hold-
ing company, and by the comptroller for national banks. Gener-
ally, the FDIC has permitted state-chartered non-member banks
to engage, through subsidiaries, in some insurance, securities,
data processing, travel agency, and other services, if such activi-
ties are permitted by the state where the bank is chartered.
There has been an increasing trend of new powers being granted
by state legislatures to state banks either directly or through
subsidiaries, but Congress has limited this development in its
1991 legislation. 7 The Comptroller of Currency, for national
banks, also has approved additional powers for banks and bank
subsidiaries, rather than through the holding company structure,
particularly with respect to securities activities. 7 8
1. Securities Activities
Banking organizations have been most successful in ex-
panding their powers in the area of securities activities. Essen-
tially all of the development has come from favorable federal
agency and court decisions.7 9 This is so, notwithstanding the
general belief that the Banking Act of 1933 in its securities pro-
visions, often called the Glass-Steagall Act, required a complete
separation of commercial and investment banking activities. It is
evident that federal banking law today does not require com-
77. 12 U.S.C. § 1831a (Supp. III 1991).
78. See, e.g., Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987); Securities Indus.
Ass'n v. Clarke, 884 F.2d 1034 (2d Cir. 1989); OCC Letter, supra note 73.
79. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 839
F.2d 47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988).
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plete separation. Instead, for state-chartered, non-member
banks, federal law has only constructed a prohibition of com-
mercial and investment banking activities in the same entity.
Non-member banks are prohibited from themselves engaging in
certain securities activities; however, they are not prohibited
from affiliating with such activities. With respect to member
banks and BHCs, recent interpretations have permitted banking
organizations to include various brokerage, mutual fund, and
general underwriting activities, so long as the non-bank affiliated
institution is not engaged principally in underwriting. In fact,
the securities powers of banking organizations have been ex-
panded to such an extent that it is questionable whether banks
feel a continuing need for any additional federal legislation in
the area.
One area of particular significance *has been the develop-
ment of section 20 subsidiaries.80 Section 20 prohibits banks that
are members of the Federal Reserve System from being affiliated
with any business organization "engaged principally" in invest-
ment banking activities. Through a long line of cases tracing
back to 1984,81 banking organizations have gained substantial
underwriting powers. The issue of underwriting began with
Bankers Trust Company engaging in commercial paper private
placement activities with institutional purchasers. The activity
was conducted in the bank, and not in the BHC or a non-bank
subsidiary. Because of this, the activity was covered by 12 U.S.C.
section 24(7), permitting national banks and state-chartered
member banks to purchase and sell securities as agent for a cus-
tomer, and 12 U.S.C. section 378, which prohibits any entity en-
gaged in investment banking from engaging in the business of
receiving deposits. The critical element of the initial Bankers
Trust litigation was the holding by the Circuit Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia that the term "underwriting" in the Glass-
Steagall Act may apply to agency activities such as the commer-
cial paper activity, but does not apply unless there is a public
offering of securities.82
In a subsequent development, Bankers Trust transferred its
private placement, commercial paper activities to the holding
80. 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1988).
81. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S.
137 (1984).
82. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 807 F.2d
1052 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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company. Since the activity could be conducted in the bank, it is
evident that it could be conducted in the holding company. The
Federal Reserve Board, however, went beyond the basis pro-
vided in the Circuit Court's decision 3 and ruled that the activity
was also permissible because as an affiliate of a member bank for
purposes of Glass-Steagall, the affiliate would not be "engaged
principally" in activities prohibited by section 20 - the "under-
writing" of securities.84 In defining what is meant by "engaged
principally," the Board utilized a "gross revenue" level of five
percent, which has subsequently been raised to ten percent, as a
basis for determining that an activity is not substantial.85 In
other words, so long as the securities affiliate's underwriting and
dealing activities constitute less than ten percent of its gross
revenue, the entity is not violating the Glass-Steagall Act.8 6
Subsequently, Citibank, J.P. Morgan, and Bankers Trust
sought to underwrite and deal in a broader range of investment
securities, such as mortgage-backed securities, municipal reve-
nue bonds, and consumer receivable-related securities, through
wholly-owned non-bank subsidiaries. A critical component of
these applications was that they proposed to combine in a single
affiliate both "eligible" securities activities such as government
securities underwriting and dealing, with underwriting and deal-
ing in ineligible securities. The purpose of including the eligible
securities was to generate permissible revenue, causing the ten
percent limit to be much higher. In the subsequent appeal, an
important interpretation of Glass-Steagall, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit concluded that while the original goal be-
hind the Glass-Steagall Act may have been to sever completely
the commercial and investment banking industries, "it fell short
of this goal - a victim of legislative compromise. " s7 Rather,
commercial banks were prohibited only from affiliating with in-
vestment activities regarded as speculative or risky and that did
not include eligible securities - securities in which banks are
permitted to deal and underwrite. The court approved the
83. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d
47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988).
84. 74 FED. RES. BULL. 192 (1989).
85. 75 FED. RES. BULL. 829 (1989); 76 FED. RES. BULL. 26 (1990); 76 FED. RES. BULL.
158 (1990); 72 FED. RES. BULL. 584 (1986); 74 FED. RES. BULL. 699 (1988).
86. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d
47, 66-67 (2d Cir. 1988).
87. Id. at 58.
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Board's general conclusion that a subsidiary would not violate
section 20 of Glass-Steagall if no more than five to ten percent
of its gross revenues were derived from activities involving bank-
ineligible securities.
Since that decision, the range of permissible activities under
section 20 has been expanded significantly. Banking organiza-
tions have since been allowed to underwrite and deal more gen-
erally in corporate debt, and even equity, securities. However,
authorization to engage in equity securities underwriting and
dealing is subject to individual review and order by the Board.
The Board is particularly concerned with equity underwriting
activities and so has developed various fire wall restrictions to
try to reduce any risk to the affiliated bank and BHC during
times of economic stress.
In 1989, the Board approved various applications to engage
through the section 20 subsidiary as agent in the private place-
ment of all types of securities, including related advisory ser-
vices. In addition, the Board has allowed some extension of
credit by the affiliated bank to the issuer of the securities and
has also permitted some placement of securities with either the
parent BHC or another non-bank affiliate. Such activities are, in
substance, quite close to firm commitment underwritings and go
well beyond agency activities.
In 1990, the Federal Reserve Board authorized three foreign
banks that were not subsidiaries of, or themselves, BHCs to es-
tablish section 20 subsidiaries. In so doing, the Board necessarily
had to approve certain modifications to the fire walls to reflect
the fact that most of the applicants' operations were conducted
outside the United States and that the applicants' activities
would not adversely affect the federal deposit insurance safety
net. Under the International Banking Act of 1978, the foreign
banks were regarded as BHCs for purposes of Glass-Steagall,
and therefore the general limitations on securities activities were
applied."'
In the area of investment advice and brokerage, the Board
has approved a steadily expanding array of combinations of se-
curities brokerage and investment advice in a single bank affili-
ate. The critical aspect of the Board's analysis was its determi-
nation that the combination of investment advice and brokerage
88. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, The Royal Bank of Canada, Barclays
PLC and Barclays Bank PLC, 76 FED. RES. BULL. 158 (1990).
[Vol. XIX:l
UNITED STATES BANKING
services does not constitute a "public sale" of securities within
the meaning of section 20 of Glass-Steagall. Rather, "public
sale" is part of the concept of "underwriting," which is not pre-
sent in brokerage and investment advice activities. In engaging
in these activities, the banking organization affiliate must act
solely as an agent, not offer securities to the public as an agent
for an issuer, and not make a market in securities with its own
funds; instead, it must deal individually with customers when
providing investment advice and brokerage. This type of com-
bined activity was initially allowed by the Board for institutional
customers, which included individuals with a net worth of one
million dollars or greater. Ultimately, the Board has approved
the offering of combined investment advice and securities bro-
kerage services to retail customers as well as institutional
customers.
In a related development in 1988, the Board approved the
application of the Bank of Nova Scotia to acquire a full service
brokerage firm located in New York City that would provide fi-
nancial advice to the Canadian federal and provincial govern-
ments."" This decision permitted interlocking officers of the
bank serving as directors of the brokerage affiliate. In addition
to the government work, the affiliate would provide securities
brokerage and investment advice to institutional customers.
A third important aspect of banking organizations' securi-
ties activities has been mutual funds. As banks are increasingly
capable of engaging in mutual fund activities, it is evident that
they have a substantial capability to engage in securities activi-
ties with their complete retail customer base. While banks are
clearly allowed to advise mutual funds, there are Glass-Steagall
difficulties involved in banks underwriting and distributing mu-
tual funds. In general, the banking agencies have permitted
banks and BHCs, and their non-bank subsidiaries, to provide in-
vestment advice to customers regarding the purchase and sale of
shares of mutual funds which are advised by a holding company
affiliate. Under United States securities laws, the dual roles are
required to be disclosed, and the banking organization employ-
ees are obligated to advise customers to read the prospectus
before investing, as well as to inform customers in writing that
the mutual fund shares are not bank obligations insured by the
FDIC or in any other way guaranteed by the bank.
89. The Bank of Nova Scotia, 74 FE. REs. BULL. 249 (1988).
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On the whole, banks and BHCs have been exceptionally
successful in expanding the range of permissible securities activ-
ities. Through various administrative interpretations that have
been affirmed by the courts, a broad range of securities activities
have been held to be permissible under Glass-Steagall, subject to
the regulators' established limitations for purposes of safety and
soundness.
2. Insurance Activities
While banking organization insurance activities have, like
securities activities, been the subject of extensive administrative
and judicial examination, they also have been the subject of im-
portant legislative determinations. Under the original 1956
BHCA, permissible non-banking activities included those of a
"financial, fiduciary or insurance nature." 90 As a consequence,
BHCs were allowed to engage in a variety of insurance activities
including credit life, accident, and health insurance (insuring the
borrower), as well as property and casualty insurance (insuring
the collateral).
A significant change occurred when the BHCA was
amended in 1982 to specifically provide that "it is not closely
related to banking or managing or controlling banks for a BHC
to provide insurance as a principal, agent, or broker except. .."
as specifically delineated in seven detailed exemptions, A
through G in the statute."1 Thus, for BHCs, insurance has gone
from being considered generally closely related to the business
of banking to being considered generally not closely related to
banking. The Federal Reserve Board has elaborated the seven
exemptions.2 The resulting regulations have been the subject of
much litigation.
Two statutes involve insurance activities of national
banks. 3 The level of detail of these statutes is much less than
those applicable to BHCs. As a consequence, in more than one
90. See Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 70 Stat. 135, 137, § 4(c)(6). See, e.g.,
National Ass'n of Life Underwriters v. Clarke, 736 F. Supp. 1162 (D.C.D.C. 1990), rev'd,
955 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1992); National Ass'n of Casualty and Surety Agents v. Board of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 856 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Independent Insur.
Agents of America, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 890 F.2d 1275
(2d Cir. 1989).
91. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1988).
92. 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(8) (1992).
93. 12 U.S.C. §§ 24(7), 92 (1988), amended by 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (Supp. III 1991).
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instance the Comptroller of Currency has authorized insurance
activities for national banks that the Federal Reserve has denied
for BHCs.
One example is the provision of insurance in towns up to a
population of 5,000. The issue is governed for national banks by
12 U.S.C. section 92 and for BHCs by 12 U.S.C. section
1843(c)(8)(C). For BHCs the Federal Reserve permits the sale of
insurance in towns with a population less than 5,000 if the hold-
ing company has a lending subsidiary in the town and the insur-
ance activities are carried out only in that town and the sur-
rounding area.
The Comptroller has long allowed national banks headquar-
tered in large cities to sell insurance in towns of 5,000 or less if
the bank has a branch in the small town. In subsequent litiga-
tion, it was determined that a national bank, from a town of
5,000, could sell insurance not only in that town but also state-
wide and nationwide.94 However, in a case initially decided in
February, 1992 it was determined that the relevant statute, 12
U.S.C. section 92, had been repealed by Congress in 1918.9' The
case is still in litigation.
In response to the difficulties that the banking organizations
have faced in gaining federal approval of expanded insurance ac-
tivities, banking organizations have turned to state legislation.
Over time, about one-third of the states have authorized a vari-
ety of insurance activities for state-chartered banks and their
subsidiaries. As a consequence, until 1991 it was possible for fi-
nancial institutions to engage in broader insurance activities
through state banking law than through federal law. The 1991
FDICIA legislation generally prohibits state banks from exercis-
ing powers not permissible for national banks, but does grandfa-
ther institutions already engaged in the sale of general insurance
products and annuities permitted by state law. 6 Also under
FDICIA, a Delaware state law designed to permit out-of-state
banking organizations to use Delaware chartered state banks for
nationwide insurance underwriting and brokerage was pre-
empted with respect to underwriting.
The various complexities and inconsistencies that have de-
94. National Ass'n of Life Underwriters v. Clarke, 736 F. Supp. 1162 (D.D.C. 1990),
rev'd, 955 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
95. Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Clarke, 955 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1992),
cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 810 (1992).
96. 12 U.S.C. § 1831(a) (1988), amended by 12 U.S.C. § 1831(a) (Supp. III 1991).
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veloped since the simple statement in the 1956 BHCA with re-
spect to insurance powers reflect the power of the American in-
surance industry lobby in Congress. While many of the limits on
banking organization securities powers have been dismantled,
Congress has consistently increased the limits on banks and
BHCs entering into the insurance business, whether through
agency or underwriting activities. This has occurred without any
apparent policy justification based on the concepts of safety and
soundness, economic neutrality, or economic concentration.
As a consequence, banking organization insurance powers
are largely a mishmash. While national banks have been allowed
to sell a broad range of annuities, the clearest statement of the
insurance industry's lobbying power is that national banks may
act as agents for the sale of credit life insurance to their custom-
ers in connection with loan transactions. In addition, BHCs have
been permitted to engage in a somewhat broader array of insur-
ance activities, but largely covering only credit life, accident, and
health insurance.9 7
VII. GEOGRAPHIC EXPANSION AND ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION
The concentration of economic resources and its perceived
effect on political power has been a significant concern in United
States bank and BHC regulation. Until the 1980s, limits on eco-
nomic concentration were an indirect result of limits on geo-
graphic expansion.98 Limits on geographic expansion indirectly
limited economic concentration by prohibiting mergers of banks
and BHCs in different markets. As the limits on geographic ex-
pansion have been relaxed, the issue of economic concentration
in banking has begun to be confronted more directly as a policy
concern.
Today, most states permit some form of statewide banking
and some form of interstate banking through multibank BHCs.
While in any particular situation the specific laws of the various
states involved must be considered, the focus here is on the pol-
icy question and projected legislative action.
In general, banks have sought a more "liberal" system that
will permit them to engage in nationwide mergers. Their argu-
ment is that in European countries, Japan, and Canada, a rela-
tively small number of banks hold the vast bulk of banking as-
97. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)(A)-(G) (1988).
98. 12 U.S.C. §§ 36, 1842(d) (1988).
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sets and those countries have not suffered from such a structure.
Banking history in the United States, of course, has been differ-
ent. The issue is whether the United States would be better
served by a small number of large banks rather than by the cur-
rent system of a large number of small banks. One should recog-
nize that going to a system of larger, nationwide banks necessa-
rily will cause a concentration of decisionmaking power both
within the private banks and within the regulatory agencies.
While the total number of banks in the United States has
not changed dramatically, bank consolidation within holding
companies has been significant, with the number of non-holding
company banks falling steadily. Total domestic banking assets
held by the largest 100 banking organizations has also steadily
increased to where, by 1991, thirty-seven organizations held fifty
percent of banking organization assets in the United States.
Because of the historic concern over the concentration of fi-
nancial power in banks, the issue has gradually become focused
on whether there should be congressionally determined, direct
limits on the size of financial institutions in addition to limits
imposed by the general antitrust laws. The general United
States antitrust laws currently apply to banking organizations.
These statutes, read alone, are rather nebulous. They have been
substantially elaborated by almost nine decades of antitrust case
law and by United States Department of Justice merger guide-
lines.99 As the interstate restrictions have been eliminated for
bank mergers and acquisitions, under current antitrust law and
guidelines, there are essentially no limits on mergers of the larg-
est banks and BHCs located in different cities.
On the surface, it appears to be easier to deal with concen-
tration as a question of pure economics. It is appealing when
confronted with the nuances of national policy questions to be
satisfied with the apparent certainty of "by-the-numbers-type"
answers which can be added, subtracted, multiplied, or divided,
as with the Department of Justice merger guidelines methodol-
ogy. There are two problems with this approach. First, underly-
ing the illusion of certainty in the numbers, there are extremely
difficult questions in determining the numbers. Second, there
are substantial questions of public policy which do not yield to a
numerical analysis. The broader question of public policy is how
99. U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
1 13,103, at 20,551-68 (June 14, 1984).
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dispersed the power over allocation of credit should be in a free
enterprise society. Credit is a key aspect in the production and
distribution of products in our society; access to credit for all
businesses is an important aspect of public policy.
One of the major purposes of bank regulation is to maintain
the stability of public confidence in the payments and monetary
system. As a consequence, it is generally agreed that our largest
banks are already too large to be allowed to fail. Today, the
large failing banks are sold with a heavy government subsidy or
are otherwise bailed out by the government in order to maintain
the stability of our financial system. It would seem to follow that
if we allow the big banks to become even bigger, we will only
guarantee more government regulation of banks.
History suggests that we either cannot, or are unable ,to,
regulate to prevent failure. As a consequence, it is worth consid-
eration to determine whether we should at least regulate to min-
imize the damage, in order to better assure political and social
stability. The impressiveness of the immense economic power of
United States financial institutions has only been matched in
impressiveness by their human limits, as evidenced by such
problem banks as Continental Illinois, M Corp, First Republic,
Seafirst, First Pennsylvania, Security Pacific, and Bank of New
England, as well as others which have required substantial gov-
ernment assistance.
If the human limits of the largest banks are as impressive as
their powers, arguably we need limits on economic concentration
so that the maximum possible freedom of banks is maintained in
our free enterprise society and regulation is minimized. Other-
wise, larger banks will almost certainly only mandate an even
greater regulatory scheme, further removing banks from market
discipline as the federal government is required to protect the
banking system from concentrations of market risks.
Consistent with this philosophy of trying to minimize gov-
ernment regulation while protecting public policy, in 1985, Paul
A. Volcker, then Chairman of the Board of the Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, testified before banking committees in
the House and Senate concerning the issues involved in inter-
state and regional banking. 100 He indicated a need to avoid un-
100. Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Address Before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and
Insurance of the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives (April 24, 1985) in 71 FED. REs. BULL. 430 (1985).
[Vol. XlX'l
UNITED STATES BANKING
due concentration of banking resources and to maintain a cli-
mate in which small institutions can flourish. Mr. Volcker
recognized both the substantial technological advances that have
occurred, as well as the numerous non-banking competitors
which are not subject to any geographic restriction. He sug-
gested that there is a need to deal with the economic concerns,
while also protecting the safety and efficiency of the banking
system, preventing undue concentration of economic resources,
and assuring benefits to the users of banking services. He con-
cluded that the present antitrust law provides considerable pro-
tection against local markets becoming noncompetitive, but not
sufficient protection of public policy concerns raised by concen-
tration of resources on a national or regional scale.
Therefore, Mr. Volcker suggested limitations which might
be taken to forestall the substantial risks of increased concentra-
tion. He recognized that some might view the limitations, at the
margin, as involving "essentially arbitrary judgments,"'' 1 as they
would be simple quantitative measurements of relative size.
Such quantitative measurements have substantial value, how-
ever, in terms of predictability, certainty, and relative ease of
administrative enforcement. His recommendation envisaged lim-
itations on the largest banking organizations acquiring other
banks. The largest BHCs in terms of domestic banking assets,
perhaps the top twenty-five or fifty, would be prohibited from
merging with each other. Further, banks would be prohibited
from obtaining (through acquisition) more than a fixed share of
the nationwide total of assets, perhaps less than five percent.
Additional prohibitions would similarly limit the increase of
concentrations of assets in any one state or region.
A. Overview of Current Issues of Geographic Expansion, Eco-
nomic Concentration, Bank Powers, Public Policy and Regula-
tory Structure
The banking industry generally seeks broader activity pow-
ers, freedom to consolidate, and less regulation. The broader
powers suggest, at least theoretically, a laissez-faire approach,
permitting banks to have largely unrestricted powers, at least in
101. Id. at 433. See also Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Financial Institu-
tions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the Committee on Banking, Finance and
Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, Apr. 24 & 25, 1985, Serial No. 99-17, 7 (also
containing the testimony and quote).
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terms of financial activities. The ability to consolidate suggests
that we move to a system of larger, nationwide banks. Because
of history and the too-big-to-fail doctrine, this necessarily would
cause both centralization of decisionmaking within the private
banks and greater regulatory power due to the degree of risk to
government policies.
While proponents of the laissez-faire approach historically
have argued for the separation of economic from social or politi-
cal policy, that is not how United States society has functioned.
Large aggregations of economic power are not viewed as inde-
pendent from social and political values. Therefore, any short
term approach utilizing a laissez-faire methodology of regulation
will ultimately result in the reimposition of federal regulation, as
occurred in the 1930s. We must search for a middle ground be-
tween laissez-faire and market insensitive regulation.
Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations'0 2 is cited for many
laissez-faire approaches. In general he is cited for the idea that
selfishness and self-interest ultimately serve the public good.
Adam Smith saw no moral virtue in selfishness; rather, he saw
its dangers. His suspicion of self-interest and lack of government
attention to economic activity is summarized in one of his best
known remarks: "People of the same trade seldom meet to-
gether, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation
ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance
to raise prices." 103 Thus, Smith did not praise self-interest as a
virtue, but simply saw it to be a driving economic force. He ex-
plained how this impulse could be harnessed to the social good,
in order to prevent producers from raising prices until customers
could afford to pay no more. His answer was competition, and
competition assured by government regulation that tamed pure
laissez-faire selfishness. The emphasis then should be on achiev-
ing as much competition as .possible, rather than permitting
mergers and expanded activities as laissez-faire right. To put it
differently, Adam Smith and others have recognized that small
economic units, whether they be retailers, banks, or manufactur-
ers, are an important refuge of political independence. The elim-
ination of smaller entrepreneurs is a natural tendency of large
firms that seek to extend their influence. United States society
102. ADAm SmrrH, THE WEALTH oF NAONS vii-viii (University of Chicago Press
1976) (1776).
103. Id. at 144.
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appears to have as a principal desire the provision and protec-
tion of relatively small economic units in what is a republic. If
the market is not regulated to assure competition, it might fail.
Congress has yet to determine whether the policies have.
changed. With the substantial elimination of limits on geo-
graphic expansion, and the substantial elimination of the Glass-
Steagall Act which separates banking from securities activities,
an important component of what remains is the historic, deep-
seated distrust in the United States of economic concentration.
While we may well be willing to allow other types of institutions
to fail, we do not wish to have a crisis of public confidence in the
banking system. As a consequence, failing banks generally have
been sold or otherwise dealt with by utilizing a heavy govern-
ment subsidy. The banks, and particularly the large banks, enjoy
substantial government protection through the support of the
FDIC structure.
Congress has the opportunity to act in all areas - to con-
struct limits on economic concentration that would affect only
the largest banks; to limit bank powers to traditional banking
activities which do not systemically permit risky activities that
in the past have caused billions of dollars of losses; and under
such a structure of limited size and limited risk exposure, to
concomitantly reduce the scope and burden of government regu-
lation. But the history of banking legislation since 1980 suggests
it is doubtful that anything significant will occur. Rather, banks,
and particularly the largest banks, will continue to bob and
weave through supposedly restrictive laws governing geographic
expansion and asset powers, to reach national and international
markets in a large and broad way.
The boundaries of financial service markets have been sub-
stantially blurred. This can be seen as a sweeping historical pro-
cess covering the years since the 1930s. Adam Smith would not
be surprised at the failure of the 1930s strait jacket legislation.
Regulation is necessary to some extent to protect the public in-
terest from the failure of markets (competition) and institutions
(public confidence in the payments system). We must let the
markets and institutions be free to operate, but must place outer
limits on their permissible consolidations and activities.
The fundamental problems of bank risk and instability are
always with us. The question is how to deal with them in the
circumstances of today. The issue of confidence is the most cen-
tral and the most intangible aspect of banking, and is the basis
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for a stable system. We have historic fears of powerful, central,
financial institutions, and thus desire decentralization of power.
But we also recognize the risks that can be represented by many
independent banks that are susceptible to liquidity problems. It
ought to be possible to deal with both concerns. The Federal
Reserve ought to be able to create an elastic supply of currency
and to provide liquidity to a national financial system so long as
asset powers are not so unregulated that there is lawful systemic
risk.
In general, what has happened over the last fifty or sixty
years is that both the source of funds of banks and the types of
bank assets (powers) have changed. Both have become more vol-
atile. Thus, both sides of the balance sheet have contributed to a
more unstable environment. How do we deal with these
circumstances?
FDIC deposit insurance is not very effective in forestalling
liquidity problems because large depositors are not covered and
can quickly withdraw or withhold their funds. Deposit insurance
works well with small depositors, but not with large depositors.
There are two basic ways to deal with regulatory reform. One
way is to develop a renewed environment of carefully regulated
relationships not unlike what we developed in the 1930s. There
would be significant restrictions on the business open to various
types of institutions. The second alternative would acknowledge
the permanence of new ways of doing business, including the
presence of large depositors, and would attempt to create safe-
guards sufficient for this new system. How do we do that?
Adam Smith would argue that we could develop market-ori-
ented solutions that would permit individual bank management
discretion within clearly established and vigorously enforced su-
pervisory guidelines which are few in number and substantially
nondiscretionary in nature. These guidelines would be such pro-
tections as capital ratios that do not favor investment securities
over private lending, market value accounting for all or most as-
sets, only historic bank asset and liability powers (and their
functional equivalents) within the FDIC net, public disclosure of
all regulatory determinations, and FDIC failure resolution poli-
cies that severely limit the use of purchase and assumption-type
transactions that effectively insure everybody. Can we do this
without returning to the pre-Depression financial panics? The
continuation of deposit insurance protects small depositors so
that their purchasing power stability would continue in force at
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all times. Thus, we would not have to worry about that type of
bank run.
A market oriented approach is preferable to a regulatory ap-
proach. Recent experience in the United States, using a regula-
tory approach for the difficult thrift and bank failure problems,
shows us that regulators tend to paper over emerging problems,
until they are so devastating that they cannot be ignored and
huge losses are the consequence. Our web of regulatory complex-
ity is so strong now that it can only be broken down under se-
vere stress, which is the worst possible circumstance.
A variety of market forces can be developed. One is not rais-
ing, and perhaps even limiting, the 100,000 dollar limit on de-
posit insurance. Another is requiring banks to use some type of
private, back-up insurance to encourage larger depositors. Asset
and liability powers, and loan to value ratios, should be limited
to traditional banking where the risks are manageable. While
there certainly would be bank failures and consequential dislo-
cations, they would be minor, isolated, and not disruptive of the
entire payment system, public confidence, and the small deposi-
tors safety net structure. Persuading Congress to adopt a meth-
odology which would result in a smaller and less significant fed-
eral program is a doubtful proposition, but one which ought to
be pursued.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The structure of United States regulation of its approxi-
mately 12,000 banks, as well as of other types of financial insti-
tutions, is largely a result of United States history and cultural
values.
With respect to commercial banks, there are two general
chartering authorities - the state and federal government. All
national banks must be members of the Federal Reserve System
and must be insured by the FDIC. All state-chartered banks, in
order to compete with national banks for deposits, also are in-
sured by the FDIC. A state-chartered bank is primarily regu-
lated by the state's department of banking, but is also regulated
by the FDIC. A national bank is primarily regulated by the Of-
fice of the Comptroller of the Currency.
BHCs are permitted to own not only banks, but also non-
bank subsidiaries that engage in activities "closely related to
banking." BHCs and their non-bank subsidiaries are subject to
the regulation of the Federal Reserve Board under the BHCA.
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Compared to other countries, banks in the United States
historically have been somewhat limited in their activities. Until
the 1930s, a rather close connection developed between invest-
ment banking (securities firms) and commercial banking. The
connection with insurance companies has been less obvious.
Nevertheless, principally through regulatory and judicial deter-
minations, banks and BHCs have gradually been able to engage
in a broader array of many securities and some insurance activi-
ties. The uncertain outline of these powers causes constant disa-
greement and a good deal of attention, but little action, in
Congress.
Another dissimilarity between bank regulation in the
United States and elsewhere involves limitations on geographic
expansion. National banks may have branches only within the
state where the bank is headquartered. But the geographic limit
on multiple bank subsidiaries of a BHC is different. Bank sub-
sidiaries of a BHC may not be located outside the state in which
the holding company's principal bank subsidiary is located, un-
less the law of the other state specifically authorizes bank own-
ership by the out-of-state holding company. Most states now
permit some form of interstate BHC banking; some are limited
by region of the country, and others are limited by the purpose
or powers of the bank, such as a limited purpose bank for the
issuance of credit cards.
Foreign banks began to increase their presence significantly
in the United States in the 1970s. As is true with United States
banks abroad, the most common forms of foreign bank presence
in the United States are agencies, branches, and subsidiaries.
Branches are empowered to accept deposits from people in the
United States, while agencies are not. Also, since the Interna-
tional Banking Act of 1978, foreign banks are authorized to es-
tablish Edge corporations to do any international banking busi-
ness in the United States. In general, the Act made substantial
strides toward national treatment of foreign banks operating in
the United States, providing approximately equal competitive
positions for foreign banks with respect to the full range of their
United States operations.
Finally, the multiplicity of bank regulators in the United
States has continued. While the structure of the three major
federal agencies and the fifty state departments of banking has
largely remained unchanged, their supervisory enforcement pow-
ers have 'increased dramatically with respect to cease and desist
[Vol. XIX:I
UNITED STATES BANKING
powers, suspension and removal powers, civil money penalties,
and capital directives.
In the early 1980s, Congress provided for more powers and
fewer restrictions on financial institution activities. Beginning in
the late 1980s, Congress redressed the imbalance by increasing
regulation. It is rational to expect that as there is a rise in risk to
government and the American taxpayer, so too there will be a
rise in regulation. But with all of our regulation, we were unable
to head off the largest financial disaster in the history of the
United States. We have stabilized the system only through a
large, undefined tax to make up for the financial institution
losses.
The losses have been large because we have been slow to
close insolvent institutions and have encouraged institutions to
take too much risk. So long as we allow financial institutions to
raise funds cheaply through the device of federal deposit insur-
ance, we must be sensitive to reducing the risk to taxpayers.
History suggests that increased regulation is not the way.
In 1873, in Lombard Street, Walter Bagehot suggested the
route to market or competition regulation, rather than micro-
regulation:104
The business of banking ought to be simple; if it is hard, it is
wrong. The only securities which a banker, using money that
he may be asked at short notice to repay, ought to touch are
those which are easily saleable and easily intelligible. If there is
a difficulty or a doubt, the security should be declined.10 5
Certainly there will always be reasonable disagreements over
what bank assets are easily saleable and easily intelligible. And,
as Bagehot also noted, "Every great crisis reveals the excessive
speculations of many houses which no one before expected
P106
But, in general, Bagehot's suggested approach will lead to
the freest and fairest markets, with the least regulation.
Broader, innovative financial activities are certainly permissible
and to be encouraged, but not at the risk of unintended govern-
ment subsidies borne by taxpayers. And so, the high cost and
burden of regulation can be avoided without limiting the scope
104. WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET 119
(Orion Press ed. 1991) (1873).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 77.
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of financial activities permissible in the United States. This can
be accomplished by limiting those within the deposit insurance
net and redressing the imbalance by reducing regulation.
